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Manyjob changes occur without intervening spells of unemployment.A
model is constructed in an attempt to understand this phenomenon. It implies
that the best workers are hired away first because, with imperfect informa-
tion, prices do not fully adjust for quality. Thus, there develops stigma
associated with failing to receive outside offers. The force of the stigma,
which affects wages, depends upon the likelihood of discovering a worker's
ability, the size of the market, and the speed of diffusionof information.
In some occupations, it implies that there quickly develop pronounceddiffer-
ences in the treatment of raided and unraided workers. A consequenceis a
theory of occupational wage dispersion. The Peter Principle——thatworkers are
promoted to a level of incompetence——is a direct implication.The model can
be applied to product markets as well to explain the relationshipbetween
price and time on the shelf.
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312—962—7464Job changes often occur without spells of unemployment. Highly educated
workers, for example, rarely suffer unemployment. A large proportion of their
job switches occur only after the new job is secured. These workers, whose
skills and ability levels are less homogeneous, differ from less skilled,
perhaps more homogeneous workers who are more likely to experience
unemployment in the process of changing jobs. Most research has focused on
job changes that imply spells of unemployment. Indeed, the primary rationale
behind the earliest papers on search theory was to explain unemployment.1 But
if there exists what some refer to as a "dual labor market,"2 these theories
may be most applicable to the secondary workers. This paper attempts to
formulate a theory of turnover and wage dynamics that may better describe the
primary labor force, defined as those who change jobs without unemployment.3
In the process, a number of previously unexamined phenomena are explored.
The first task is to understand the relationship between worker quality
and turnover. Do markets clear more quickly for the most able workers? Why
is it that there is a tendency to try to hire the most able individual, even
though his wage rate is higher? It appears that prices do not adjust fully
for differences in quality. Buyers constantly seek that diamond in the rough.
This also yields the Peter Principle: The best workers are stolen away so
those who remain appear incompetent relative to their peers.
The process that is examined makes "stigma" an important feature of labor
markets. Because of the information that is produced when workers succeed or
fail to receive outside offers, workers who are undesired by outsiders are—2—
treated very differently from those who enjoy an active outside market. Thus,
stigma, which can be thought of as the consequences of a worker's history of
offers and/or employment, is modeled and treated explicitly.
This results in an understanding of the dynamics of worker turnover and
wage evolution. Sometimes the patterns may be unusual ones. For example,
there may be little action for the first few years of an academic economist's
career. Then one job offer triggers others. There is a flurry of activity,
wages change rapidly and a job change may or may not occur. After this, a
stable period follows, with few offers coming his way again. (Such dynamics
are often said to characterize the market for firms where takeover attempts
are the equivalent of outside offers.)
The patterns of turnover and wage change can be related in a very simple
way to the size of the market, the difficulty associated with learning a
worker's ability, and the speed of diffusion of information. For example,
when information is difficult to acquire, wages have little dispersion within
an occupation, age—earnings profiles are flat, and stigma is unimportant.
Further, there is only a very weak relation between ability and tenure. Other
relation are easily traced.
A number of implications are derived. Among the more interesting are:
(1) The best workers are raided first. Everyone goes after high quality,
highly—priced ones rather than lower quality, lower—priced ones.
(2) wages differ substantially between workers who receive outside offers
and those who do not. This provides implications for wage differentials
across occupations and for intra—occupational wage variation.
(3) A corollary is that the importance of stigma depends upon the proba-
bility that an outsider recognizes the ability of a given firm's workers and
upon the number of buyers. Stigma is not likely to be as pronounced for—3—
assembly line workers as it is for research academicians. As a result, wages
are less closely related to ability and age—earnings profiles are flatter for
assembly line workers than they are for academicians.
(4) The oldest workers on a given job are the least productive. This
paraphrases the Peter Principle4 and results because the most able of the young
workers are bid away.
(5) Workers maximize their expected wealth by working for the firm that
is most likely to know their true ability levels. This applies even to low
ability workers.
(6) Txrnover may exhibit an inverted U—shaped relation to experience for
any one worker, even though the aggregate relation is exponentially declining
in experience.
Before any implications are derived, it is necessary to construct a
simple model and to outline a few basic relations. That is done in the next
section.
I A MODEL
To focus on competition among firms for workers, we begin with a simple
model that captures the key features of the effects of informational differ-
ences and informed trading. This enables us to examine phenomena such as
raids, offer matching and imitation in the labor market.
Suppose that there are two firms,j and k. Firm j hires the worker
initially so that given any tie in offers from j and k, the worker remains
at j.5 Firm k initiates a raid by offering wk > w. The worker's product
at firm j is M, a random variable that, for simplicity, is distributed
uniformly between zero and one. It is easy to allow for specific capital but
this is ignored throughout.—4—
Information takes the following form: With probability P, j learns
the true value of M before raiding occurs and with probability(1 -P)
knows only the ex ante distribution of M at that time.Ifjlearns the
truth, then j becomes an "informed" trader. Similarly, with probability k
(not necessarily equal to P) k learns the true value of M before the
raiding offer must be made arid with probability (1 -k'k only knows the
ex ante distribution of M.
Public Information;
Raids are selective because the raider is susceptible to "winner's
curse."6 Firm k knows that on average, j lets the worker go when j's
assessment of the worker's output falls below wk This implies that under
many circumstances, any raiding strategy that can succeed results in losses to
the raider. Everything depends upon the nature of market information.7
To see this, suppose that j always knows what k knows, either because
k's strategy is different in all cases so that j can infer what k knows,
or because k's information is public. This is characterized by the informa-
tion in Table 1:
Table 1
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The proposition that k can never raid successfully followstrivially
from the fact that j has all of k's information, and more.Any strategy
that is profitable to k is immediately matched by j.Any unprofitable move
is ignored by j so that k steals the workers only whendoing so is
unprofitable.
Winner's curse occurs whenever k is uninformed. The expectedproduct
of the worker is 1/2. But any attempt by k to raid atwk > 0 fails or
results in losses.
If k is uninformed and 3 is uninformed (the bottom right cell of
Table 1), then 3 will match any offer up to E(M) =1/2.A raid at any
Wk > 1/2 is ex ante unprofitable. If j is informed and k is not, then 3
matches offers when M > Wk so k gets nothing if M >wk. But 3 declines
to match when wk > M. So k only succeeds in stealing the worker whenWk >
M, and this is a losing strategy. In fact, given that k is uninformed,
k's expected gain is
Wk
(1) P. f (M—
wk)f(M)dN
=P•f(M—





for Wk < 1/2. (For Wk > 1/2, the expected gain is even less at
+ (1 —Pi)(wk
-1/2).)The expected gain is negative when k is
uninformed so no raid occurs when k is uninformed. Further, by assumption,
when k is informed, so is j. All raids are unsuccessful. The conclusion is
that no raids occur in the absence of private information and firm—specific
capital.—6—
SuccessfulRaids:
In order for k to ever attempt a raid on j, at least one of two
assumptions must be relaxed: Either there must be specific capital, so that
the worker is worth more to k than to j, or k's information must be
private. Relaxation of either assumption is sufficient to guarantee that
raids sometimes occur. We focus on informational differences.
It is important to consider not only whether a firm is informed about the
worker's product, M, but also whether it is informed about the rival's state
of knowledge. Both affect the optimal wage strategy. What is essential is
that there be some situations when the current employer does not know that his
rival is informed. There are a number of justifications for this possibility.
First, the worker's claim of an outside offer is not credible. He always has
an incentive to claim this if wages rise as a result. Second, k has no
incentive to convince jthatthe offer is genuine because doing so
frustrates all raid attempts. On the contrary, k should conceal its attack.
Third, the "outside offer" may reflect the worker's value of leisure, which
has no bearing on M.8
For simplicity, assume that an informed firm is also aware of its rivals'
state of knowledge, but that no uninformed firm knows what its rivals know.
This allows all the relevant possibilities and saves on tedious and un-
enlightening discussion. The more general case is described in the appendix.
Under this situation, raids occur only if k is informed. If. k is
uninformed then it is never profitable to raid. This is easily seen: An
uninformedraider encounters either aninformed or uninformed firm j. Ifj
isinformed,which happens with probability P, then no profitable raid can
succeed: K only succeeds in stealing those workers for whom M < wk





Ifjis also uninformed, which occurs with probability (1 — only
raids at Wk > w. are successful. Now, in competition,w is the maximum
wage consistent with zero profits. (This is derived more formally below.)
Therefore, if k is uninformed, there is no possibility that an offer of
> w to a randomly chosen worker can result in profits since K has no
informationaladvantage over jand M is the sameat both firms. But
=wdoes not result in a successful raid. So, k's profit from raiding
whenuninformed is zero ifj is uninformed, but negative if jisinformed.
Therefore,k does not raid when uninformed.
Raids do occur, however, when k is informed. Recall that k's move is
non—informative. Since w is the wage that j offers to a worker about
whom j is uninformed, k raids workers atw + about whom it knows that
M > w. If j is also informed and j knows that the outside offer is
genuine, then the raid fails, because j matches the offer. But with
probability (1 — jis uninformed so that the raiding offer attracts
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(It is positive because the minimum value of —w.+ —.j occurs at w =1where
—— w,+—-= 0and since w. < 1.) So when k is informed that M > w,a 2 j 2 3— J
raid occurs.
It might seem that an informed j would behave differently with respect
to high—ability workers than with respect to low—ability ones. This is not
correct. The informed j could make w a function of M. But nothing is—8—
gained for workers with M > w3. No w(M) <M acts as a deterrent to an
informed k. No w(M) > M is profitable if k is informed and no
uninformed k raids. Nothing is gained by conditioning w on M, even
when j has the information to do so.
Further, risk—neutral workers who do not know their abilities will not
sign with any firm that retains the right to reduce wages after observingM.
This would result in an expected wage for unraided workers that is less than
w andsince w to unraided workers guarantees zero profit, a fixed w to
all unraided workers dominates.10
The results of this section can be summarized: In the absence of any
firm—specific capital, raids only occur if raiders have private information
and if the raider is informed. For a raid to be profitable, the raider must
know the realization of a worker's output and not merely the distribution.
Additionally, raids only occur on workers from the upper part- of the
ability distribution. Raiders only make profits on those workers, becausethe
current firm pays all workers on which it is uninformed some given wage, Wj.
The market has a bias toward underpaying high quality workers.
The Optimal Wage Strategy and Equilibrium:
Now let us derive more formally j's optimal wage strategy and describe
the market equilibrium. If both j and k are informed, then j matches
any offer by k and w =M,the worker is paid his marginal product. Firm
j earns zero profit on this worker.
If j is uninformed, but k is informed, k raids. But since jdoes
not believe worker claims of outside offers, k succeeds in stealingthe
worker at w + C. Again ys profits are zero. -
-J—9—
Firm j retains the worker at wagew whenever k does not raid.
Firm k does not raid either because k is uninformed, or because k is
informed that M < w,
3
Firm j offers w to unraided workers. The goal is to derive w.
Recall that k only raids when k is informed that M >w so j is not be
left with a representative sample of workers. Even though j may not be able
to verify any one worker's claim of an outside offer (and consequently does
not react to it),j knows that workers who actually do leave the firm come
from the part of the ability distribution where M exceedsw. Again, there
are two reasons why a worker remains with firm j: Either the worker has M >
w., but k does not know it, or the worker has M < w1——the worker is an
undiscovered star or an already overpaid performer. The probability that
M > w and k is uninformed is (1 -wi)(l
— since M is distributed
uniformly between 0 and 1. The expected value of M if this is true is (1 +
w1)/2.The probability that M < w is w1 (k's information being
irrelevant here). The expected value of M if this is true is w/2. The
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Now,in equilibrium the competitive firm must earn zero profit. Zero
profit is already guaranteed for workers who are raided (successfully or
unsuccessfully). So in equilibrium, w must be set so that zero profits are
earned on those workers who are not raided. Thus, from (2),






Equation (2) simply says that j must set w so that expected profit on
unraided workers is zero, given that only workers with M > w are stolen
away. Any w less than that amount results in positive profits so that
another firmcanattract all workers.Every w greaterthan that amount
results in negative profit.
Solving equation (3) for w yields two roots, but one is always





The equilibrium can be sunimarized: Workers come to firm i and are told




If a worker receives an outside offer that jlearns is genuine and if j is
informed that M > w1, i matches the offer and the worker's wage is driven
up to M. (Only workers with M > w. receive outside offers.) If the worker
receives an outside offer and j cannot verify that M > w, j allows the
worker to leave. Zero expected profit is guaranteed.
That w < 1/2 implies that unraided workers are underpaid relative to
the population mean. This is because all firms try to steal undiscovered
workers whose values exceed their wage. The search for pearls leaves mostly
oysters behind so that the output of remaining workers falls short of the
population mean.
Raiders' Profits and Costly Information:
Asthingsstand, raiders earn profits. Although raided firms earn zero—11—
expectedprofit, raiders are able to earn profits on those workers whom they
succeedin acquiring.
The expected profit on each raided worker is




1•Itseems that all firms would prefer to be 1 —w, 1 —F(w)
3 3
raiders only. In fact, the more raids attempted, the more profitable the
firm.
The reason for this result is that k is an exogenous "gift" to out-
siders in the current setup. A raider is endowed with a specialized factor——
information__Pk of the time and the endowment costs the firm nothing. Firms
endowed with such a gift earn rents on the scarce factor.
More realistic, perhaps, is the situation where potential raiders are
forced to buy information at some cost. Suppose, for example, that only if a
firm bears cost A does it learn a worker's ability with probability k
otherwise it learns the worker's ability with probability zero. (Think of A
as time spent reading a worker's resume, which results in useful information
ofthe time.) The expected return on the investment in information is
k fwM -w.)dM
1
andthe cost is A. The investment is made so long as A < k fM —w)dM.
But this still leaves the raider with positive profits, which induces entry
into the raiding business. Entry of other raiders reduces the likelihood that
any one informed raider acquires the worker. In fact, equilibrium occurs when
there are N raiders such that
A =— f(M—w.)dM
wj—12—
This not only ensures zero profits for raiders, but also determines the
equilibriumnumber of raiding firms.
Anyone firm may actas both raider and employer of new workers, but
thereis nothing that necessitates tying thetwoactivitiestogether. The
determinationof whether a firm engages in both types of hiring or just one
type isanalogous to the determination of the product mix of a multiproduct
firm.
Ex Ante Differences in Information:
Thissection considers what happens when firmshave different probabili-
ties of becoming informed. This èan arise because firms learn more about
theirown workersthan about others or because some firmsarebetter screeners
thanothers.
What is essential in this model is that there is a difference between ex
ante and ex postinformation. Thinkof becoming informed about a worker as
occurring when reading one of his articles in the AER. If the potential buyer
only reads one out of 20 papers per month then P =.05.While it is likely
that the current employer reads more of his own workers' papers than others'
so that Pj >k'it is still possible that an outsider mayreadone that the
current employer overlooks.
Suppose that before the worker is hired, the two firms have different
amounts of information so that >P.With which firm should the worker
sign? Since the wage at the current firm depends upon getting outside offers,
should the worker sign with the firm with poorest information? Does this
depend upon whether the worker is high or low ability?
These questions are easily answered using eq. (4). If the worker signs





if he is unraided, which occurs with probability (1 — Ifheis raided
and j knows his ability he receives M. This happens with probability
If he is raided and j does not know his ability, then he goes, to k
at wage w +epsilon.This happens with probability k1 —P).
So
expected wage is (ignoring epsilon)
- -1
(5) E(w) =((1- + —P)]1/(1 — —1
+
PjPkM
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When is (w) >E(w)k?The answer is always. It always pays to sign
with the firm with the best cx ante information, independent of ability even
if the worker knows his own ability.
The proof is straightforward: Assume the opposite. Then Pj > and





which implies Pj < k• This results in a contradiction.
The intuition follows: First, that ability level is irrelevant is
obvious. The worker only gets M when both and k are informed so the
identity of j and k is irrelevant. Second,j knows that the better
informed is k, the more likely is j to get stuck with the lowest quality
workers. As such, the equilibrium wage that j offers falls with k• Since—14—
jexperiences less adverse selection, j can (and in equilibrium will) offer
a higher wage to unraided workers. Since a worker who is raided is raided
at w +C (unlessjis also informed), the worker always benefits from
increases in w. Thus, he always signs with the firm least susceptible to
adverse selection or with the best informed firm, independent of his ability.
The current employer does not pay higher—ability workers higher wages
unless an outsXder forces him to do Even low quality workers benefit from
working for the most informed employer. That employer is least likely to be
affected by winner's curse and offers the highest equilibrium wage to unraided
workers, a wage that is independent of ability levels. It requires two
informed buyers to drive the worker's price to M, and their identity
relative to the current employer is irrelevant.
Imitation
Most of the interesting phenomena can be analyzed only in a ntultiperiod,
multifirm context. The desire here is to analyze the way that one firm
Imitates another and to trace the evolution ofwagesand turnover as it varies
with worker ability level.
Think of there being N +1ex ante identical firms, each of which has a
probability P of being informed (for simplicity of notation, assume that P
is identical for all N traders). The worker is at one of the N +1firms,
and, as above, call it j. An innovation in this section is that there are
two ways to obtain information about a worker: First, one can discover the
worker's productivity by oneself--discovery-—and this happens with proba-
bility P each round. Second, one can infer the worker's productivity——
inference——by observing the actions of others.'3 Thus, a raid during the
previous round tips off others that the worker's productivity exceeded his—15—
previous wage. This often leads to an inverted U—shaped path of raids over
the worker's lifetime. Few raids take place initially. Then there is a
flurryofactivity that dies away rapidly. The shape of the time path of
raids depends in interesting ways upon the average levels of information in
the market, and upon the number of potential buyers. Additionally, the
complete time path of wages for movers and stayers is derived.14
The difference between the two types of information is characterized in
the following way: Information that the firm obtains by itself with probabil-
ity P per round can be used in that round. In order to use inferential
information, it is necessary to wait one round.15 The informed trader gets a
head start and moves immediately. Those who learn the worker's product by
inference, only do so after the informed trader has made his move because it
is that move that tips off others.16
To derive the complete dynamics, it is useful to consider first the time
path of raids on a worker with M > w1 where w1 is defined as the wage that
the current employer pays to unraided workers in round 1. Since, as will be
shown below, wT > w1, those workers remain susceptible to raids
throughout.
In the first round, there is only one way that a raid can occur: One of
the N firms must make a discovery. The probability that this occurs is P




In round 2, things are more complicated. In round 1, there were three
relevant possibilities: there were no raids, there was exactly one raid, or
there was more than one raid.—16—
Define p1 —p.with probability there were no raids in round 1
because no outsider was informed. In that case, round 2 is identical to round
1 and there are NP expected raids.
If there was more than one informed firm in round 1, then the equilibrium
was that the worker's wage was driven up to M in competition. Consequently,
no subsequent raids occur.
The most interesting case is when there was exactly one raid in round 1
and when the current firm, j, was also uninformed. This happens with
probability
NPPN
To allow for further generality, allow for a diffusion parameter that may
be less than 1: If one raid occurs in round 1 then N firms are informed via
inference at the beginning of round 2.17 The eN informed firms raid with
certainty, whereas the (1 —O)Nfirms can still learn by discovery with





Bound 3 is similar, but slightly different. If there were any raids in
round 1, then the wage rate for the worker was driven up to M by the end of
round 2 at the latest. Inference and imitation by others ensures this.8
If there were no raids in either round 1 or 2, then round 3 is just like
round 1 so the expected number of raids is NP. This occurs with probability
2N—17—
Again the interesting case is when there was exactly one raid in round 2
(and therefore no raids in round 1). That occurs with probability
PNNPPN =2Nandyieldsexpected raids
8N +(1—8)Np
Thus,the total number of expected raids in round 3 is
R(3) =P2NNPt1+ N(P + 8(1 —P))]
M> 2
In general,











The value of R(t) —R(T—1)for T> 3is always negative because P < 1.
This implies that beyond round 2, the expected number of raids declines as
time progresses.
For R(2) —R(1),the story is different:
(11) R(2) —R(1) =NP((PN(l+N(P+8(1—P)))
—1]
M>w1 M>w1
This is positive iff P1(l +N(P + 0(1—P))> 1.
Figure 1 simulates some raiding patterns for different values of N
and P.—18—
When P =1,all learning occurs immediately and no raids occur beyond
round 1 (see panel 1). For high values of P, the pattern is exponential
(see panel 4). But for smaller values of P, an inverted U—shaped pattern
results (see panel 3). The reason is that in the first round, the only way
that a raid can occur is through independent discovery. But in round 2, raids
can occur either by discovery or by inference. Further, all subsequent rounds
have a lower expected number of raids because the likelihood of no earlier
discovery falls as the number of previous rounds increases.
Also obvious is that an increase in N makes the number of raids in
later periods drop off more quickly (compare panel 5 to panel 3). This is
like introducing more information into the market.
For very small values of P, raids are unlikely to occur so that hf e—
cycle variation in wages is likely to be smaller——age—earnings profiles are
flatter——in occupations where learning about worker ability is very difficult.
Stated alternatively, age—earnings profiles for "visible" jobs should be
steeper and display more variance across workers than those for less visible
jobs at equivalent skill levels. (Competition implies, however, that the
expected values of the profiles across the two occupations are the same for
similar workers.)
Inverted U—shaped patterns of raids are possible for high quality
workers. The likelihood of the inverted U—shape increases with learning by
inference relative to discovery: 0, the parameter of diffusion has a clearly





eliminates any possibility of inference because all firms learn through
discovery and react immediately (compare panel 6 to panel 5).—19—
Stigma
The previous discussion relates only to the high—abi)ity workers. But
what of the others in the firm? Related, what can the current firm infer from
the failure of some of its workers to receive outside offers and what is the
appropriate response in the multiperiod setting? Finally, what is the
aggregate pattern of raids and turnover for the entire labor force? These
issues are addressed in this section.
First, it is necessary to determine the wage that the current firm offers
to all (uriraided) workers in round 1. If we allow the spot wage to prevail
during each round, then an equation analogous to (3) must hold. The only
difference is in the conditional probabilities. The probability that a worker
was not raided and that M > w1 is (1 —w1)(PN),where w, is the wage
that the current employer pays all unraided workers in round 1. The probabil-
ity that he was not raided and M < w1 is simply w1. So, in equilibrium,
(1 _w1)PN i ___________ (12) w1 = -N { 2
+
(wi/2] (1 —w1)P+ w1 (1 —w1)P
+
Solving (12) for w1 yields
-1
(13) w1 = -N
(1/P )— 1
Zero expected profits are earned in round 1.
Similar relationships hold for later rounds. In any round t, workers
who remain with the firm at the end of the round fall into one of of two cate-
gories: The worker may have H < w so that no profitable raid is possible.
This happens with probability w. Alternatively, the worker has M >
but no outside firm has discovered this fact in the t periods. This happens
with probability (1 -wT)PNT.Again, in equilibrium, w must be chosen so
that w. equals the expected output of workers who are unraided through Iperiods. Thus, the analogue of equilibrium condition (12) in roundtis
-Nt (1-w)p 1+w w w t r Ti T r I (14) w = 1+ I -NT 2 -NT 2 (1—w)p +w (1—w)p ÷w I I T I




Eq. (15) gives the evolution of wages for individuals who do not receive
any alternative offers through tperiods.Since w1 equals the expected
output of a worker who is not raided through I rounds, it is also true that
(16) E(Munraided through I rounds) =
— 1
(1/P )— 1




IfP =0(so that P =1),the failure of a worker to be raided is
uninformative. No outsider could have any information soremaining unraided
carries no stigma. Thus, the expected level of M is 1/2, thesame as the




p+1 (1/P 1) —1
—20—
(15)
If P =1(so that P =0),then outsiders are always informed. Given any
choice of WT by the current firm, all workers with M >w1 are stolen away.
This implies that the remaining workers have M <w1. Under these circum-
stances the only w1 that does not result in losses for the current firm is
WI =0.Winner's curse operates at full force and the original firm takes
that into account in setting the initial wage. All workers are raided and—21—
each worker receives a wage equal to his marginal product. As P goes to 1,
the message and stigma associated with the failure to be raided grows
stronger.
A number of implications follow immediately. First, and somewhat
trivially, the relation between observed wage and actual marginal product
becomes tighter, the higher is P. The more information that is had by
outsiders, the more often the current firm is forced to pay a worker his
marginal product. In the two extreme cases, when P =0,all workers were
paid wt =1/2so the distribution of ability has infinite variance relative
to the distribution of wages. When P =1,each worker is paid M so the
distribution of wages replicates the distribution of ability.
Second, the expected value of output for unraided workers is lower in
later rounds than in early ones. Differentiating (16) with respect to T,
one obtains that19
t—3E(Munraided through r rounds)
< at — t
The longer the duration during which the worker fails to receive an offer, the
lower is his expected value. Recall that there are two reasons that a worker
remains unraided: Rivals are uninformed or M < Wt. For any given w, the
proportion of workers who are unraided because of rivals' ignorance falls with
time since rivals are more likely to be informed as time progresses. Thus,
the conditional expectation of unraided workers' output falls over time so
must decline with t.
This leads to an important implication: The quality of raided workers
falls over time. Initially, only the most able workers get outside offers.
Everyone seems to be going after the best workers. Uncertainty over ability,
makes them the bargains in the labor market. As w1 falls with T, i.e., as—22—
the firm updates its evaluation of the worker's worth, successively lower
ability workers become susceptible to raid. (Recently, firms who made job
offers to Harvard MBAS tied the salary offer inversely to the length of time
before acceptance. One interpretation is that the firms recognized that only
lower quality workers remain in the job market as time progresses and lower
the wage accordingly.)
The claim that the best workers are raided first is a statement that is
made conditional upon observables. It does not imply, for example, that more
highly educated workers are raided first. It implies only that among those
with a given level of education, the best in the group are raided. This also
implies that not conditioning upon anything, the higher ability workers are
raided first across the entire population. The reason is that if ability is
given by y, then the estimate of y based on observable x's must have the
property that x's and the estimated residuals are uncorrelated. Since raids
are based upon residuals (all observed information having already affected the
initial wage offer), there is no correlation between raids and the observed
x's. High residual workers are raided and they are, on average, of higher
ability than the unraided ones.
This result is another manifestation of the Peter Principle. The best
workers are stolen away or promoted out of the job. Those who remain are of
lower average quality so they appear "incompetent" relative to the entire
population of workers doing that job.
The way that stigma operates depends upon the probability of an outside
offer. As already pointed out, if P is close to zero, then the failure to
receive an outside offer carries little informational content so the wages of
assembly line workers are likely to be less variable across workers than those
of research academicians. Since researchers publish their thoughts, P, the—23—
probability that an outsider learns of a worker's productivity is quite
high. But it is very unlikely that a star assembly line worker at GM is like-
ly to be discovered by Ford. From (8), the expectation of M given no raid
in round 1 is likely to be closer to the unconditional expectation for
assembly line workers than for research economists. This is a step toward a
theory of occupation wage differentials,2° but more toward a theory of wage
dispersion within an occupation.
Another wage differential is of interest. It is useful to examine how
the difference between wages of raided workers and those of unraided workers
varies with the likelihood of discovery, the number of potential employers,
and experience (P, N and 1). To do this, it is necessary to derive the
expected value for M for workers who are raided in round t.
Workers who were raided in round t and not before fall into one of two
categories. Either they were susceptible to raid before period r, but were
undiscovered. This occurs with probability_1(l —wT_l).Or they have
just become susceptible to raid in roundIbecause w1_1 > M > This
occurs with probability (w11 -w1).Thus, the expected output of workers
who are raided in round I is
(17) V +w
('r—l)N r t—1 t
—( raidedin 1_1M+"1_1),2] +(w1—w)L 2 E =E(M fort>2 I round I (T—1)N —
P (1 —w11)+ (w1 —
w1)
=(1+w1)/2 for 1= 1
Raided workers receive their marginal products (at the latest by the fol-
lowing round) so their average wage is also given by the R.H.S. of (17).
It is difficult to characterize analytically the behavior of (17).
However, a series of simulations is informative and illustrates the importance
of stigma that results when one is unwanted by others. Table 2 presents the
results.-24—
The first panel of table 2 sets P =.001and N =3.This can be
thought of as the extreme asebiy_line_worker_ifl_a_big_threeaut0maker
case. (Actually, the number of firms is 4 =N+1.)Note that even after 15
rounds, the conditional expectation and wage of M for unraided workers is
only trivially different from the unconditional expectation of .5. The
failure of an assembly—line worker to be raided by another firm is not
informative because the probability that a high—quality worker will be
discovered by a rival firm is small.
At the other extreme, in the last panel, is the case where P =1.Here,
number of firms is irrelevant because each outsider always has perfect if or—
mation. There is no equilibrium wage offer greater than zero that does not
result in losses to the current employer. Thus, w(T) =0and the entire
population is raided.21
The research academician might fit somewhere in the middle. If the
number of rival firms equals 10 and P =.2(panel 6), then by the beginning
of the third round, the expectation of unraided workers' output has fallen to
the lowest 3.4% of the ability distribution. If this characterizes the true
situation, it implies that outside offers are an extremely important signal.
Those who do not receive them are treated very differently from those who
do. E.g., the average wage of workers who are raided in round 1 is .62 as
compared with .034 for those unraided at the end of three rounds. (Of course,
the length of a round, although conceptually well defined, is difficult to
calibrate empirically. A round is that period during which information
remains private. whether that is a month or a year is an open question.)
There is no monotonic relation that is independent of P between dateof
turnover and the wage change that occurs with the job switch.This can be
seen by comparing the "Difference" columns of table 2 whenP =.001,to that
column when P =.2for a given N.22—25—
It is now possible to put everything together so as to derive turnover
behavior. First, the total number of raids in any period T consists of the
si.n of raids of all groups subject to raid. For example, in round 1, the only
group that can be raided are those whose M > w1. The expected number of
raids on a worker in round 1 is
R(1) =[Prob(M> w1)) [Expected number of raidsiM > w1)
=(1-w1)NP.
In round 2, twogroups aresubject to raids: those with M > w1and
those with w2 < M < w1.
Eq. (7) already provides the general formula for R(t)IM>w. It is
tedious to derive a similar formula for the group with < M < so it
is derived in the appendix and presented in (18):
(18)
R(T)< M < w1
=0 for t<t
(1_Pt)N for t=t
=NPNt[P+ (1_Pt)N(P + 0(1—?))] for t =t+1
=NPP1'tl + NC? + 0(1—P))] for r > t+1.
Given (1) the total number of expected raids in any period T is the
probability weighted sum of raids on each of the groups. Thus:
Total Expected Raids ____t
(19)on workers of unknown R(r) =(wi
—w)R(r) < M <
quality in period T t=1 t t—1
where w01. The heaviest weight goes to the group with M > w1. All other—26—
groups have decreasingly important probability weights in (19). This implies
that the pattern observed for the labor market as a whole willclosely
resemble that of figure 1. But again, some simulations are instructive.
First, it is interesting to compare the pattern of raids that workers in
different categories experience. Figure 2 shows the pattern of raidson
workers with < M < w_1 as t varies: the values of the parameters are
P =.1,N =5,e =1.
There are two patterns that stand out. First and most obvious, is that
for higher values of t, that is, for thegroup, say, with w5 < M < w4 as
opposed to w1 < M <.1 (panel 4 vs. panel 1), the raids start later. For
the group with w5 < M <w4, raids do not begin until the fifth round whereas
they begin in the first round for the group withw1 < M < 1. Lower-quality
workers tend to be raided later in their careers.
Second, the pattern changes as t increases. There is a tendency to get
more raids in the initial raiding period because information accumulates
before it becomes profitable to make a move. For example, consideran
individual with w10 < M <w9 (panel 5). It takes ten periods before the
wage that unraided workers receive drops low enough to make a raid attempt
successful. But during those ten periods, information accumulates on the
worker so that when the tenth period arrives, many are able to make a move.
Of course, the effect of these spikes is likely to be extremely small in
the aggregate for two reasons: First, the number of workers inany given cell,
w < N < w,_1 is very small (except for t =1).Second, most workers are in
situations where P, the probability of being discovered, is also likely to
be low. So for example, in figure 2, panel 7, if P =.001, N =io,8 1
and t =10,the size of the spike is small——only .1 raids occur in period
10. With such a low P, inference is more important than discovery and the—27—
period during which most raids occur is period 11. But even there less than
one expected raid occurs. When we take into account that only w9 —w10of
the workers are in this category, the observed effect is trivial.
The entire picture is put together in figure 3. Figure 3 simulates equa-
tion (19) for different values of P, N, and 0. It represents the expected
pattern of raids on a worker of unknown quality over time. As such, it is the
stntt of raids on each group w < M < w_1 as t varies weighted by the
probability that the worker falls into that group. Since the probability that
a worker has M such that w, < M < 1, is largest among groups, the pictures
tend to be dominated by the pattern of raids on workers of that groups.
Different patterns of raids are possible. The inverted U—shape is most
likely when 6 is close to 1 (so that inference is important), when P is
small (so discovery is unlikely), and when N is small (so that discovery is
unlikely). The exponentially declining pattern is most likely to occur when
0 is close to zero (cf. panel 8 to 7, 2 to 1, 4 to 3, and 6 to 5) so that
inference is unimportant, when P is large (cf. panels 3 to 5) so that
discovery is important, and when N is large (cf. panel 3 to 7 to 1) so that
discovery is important.
This provides some simple implications. High turnover occupations are
those most likely to have high values of N and P. Both imply a tendency
toward exponentially declining raiding and turnover with time. In low
turnover occupations with few firms and little visibility (low N, low P),
the pattern of raiding and turnover is likely to be inverted U—shaped. (This
assumes that variations in 0 are small across occupations.)
Stated alternatively, the pattern of raids allows the empiricist to
identify p, 0 and the length of the round. Of course, assumptions about the
shape of the distribution of M are crucial for identification.—28—
The probability of turnover is similar, but not identical to the
probability of a raid. A raid is successful if and only if the current
employer is uninformed. The probability of turnover in round T on a worker
with Wt < M < wt_i is derived in the appendix and given by
(20) Prob. Turnover (t) < M < t t-1
=0 for T<t
-t -Nt P(1 —P ) forT=t
-N(t—1) -N -t -N(t—1) -(r—1) P (1 —P)P + {NP (1 —P )(1 —0)]
=
N N N for t>t+1.
(1 —(1—0)+ (1 —0)(1 —p)]
Thenthe probability of turnover for any randomly drawn worker is derived from
(20), weighted by the probability that w < M <
(21)Prob. Turnover(t) = (w —w)(Prob. Turnover(T) ) t—1 t w < M <
II. Extensions and Further Implications
Wages andTenure:
The relation of wages to tenure is not straightforward. Since it is the
best workers who are stolen away most rapidly, those young workers who remain
in their jobs are likely to be of lower quality. So, tenure and wages can be
negatively related. But in a sample of older workers, those who most recently
changed jobs are likely to have been raided later in life. They are the lower
quality workers so that tenure should be positively related to wages among
older workers. which effect dominates in a sample of the entire population is
ambiguous, but one implication is clear: The relation of tenure to wages
becomes more positive with age. I know of no evidence on this point.23—29—
Stigma and Unemployment:
"Stigma" is often used to refer to workers who suffer spells of unemploy-
ment and find that subsequent demand for their services is adversely affected.
Indeed, there is a significant literature that attempts to analyze these
spells and to determine whether they are the result of inherent worker
heterogeneity or of the signalling effect of unemployment.24
This paper focuses primarily on job changes without unemployment. How-
ever, if the current firm, j, is reinterpreted as the state of unemployment
and is defined as the reservation wage, then the model applies to unem-
ployed workers as well. The interpretation of T is the length (or number)
of spells of unemployment. As the worker is "unraided" out of unemployment
for a longer period of time, wj falls and so does the average wage of raided
workers. Thus, individuals who leave the state of unemployment quickly (are
raided during initial rounds) have the highest expected wages (see table 2).
Those who are unemployed for longer periods have lower expected wages because
they are, on average, lower ability workers and their reservation wages are
lower on average.
Lower values of P and N reduce the bite of stigma. Lower N is
interpreted as fewer potential buyers. Individuals who are unemployed during
a recession should not experience as large a wage depression following a given
spell of unemployment as those who are unemployed during an expansion. This is
illustrated in table 2 by comparing the path of wages for raided workers
(those who eventually become employed in this context) when P =.01,N =3
to that when P =.01,N =100.The intuition is clear: When there are few
buyers in the market, little can be inferred from the failure of a particular
worker to be discovered by one.—30—
Similarly, low values of P imply that unemployment should have small
effects on subsequent wages. Here P can be thought of as the probability
that a given buyer discovers a given worker. The value of P is low when
workers are not making themselves known to potential firms. Consequently, the
effect of being out of work, but in school or even on vacation, should be less
detrimental to future wages than that of being unemployed for the same period
of time while actively searching. Active searchers have higher P's so more
can be inferred about those who do not find jobs. Table 2 illustrates this
point as well. Compare the path of average wages of raided workers when
P =.001,N3 to that when P =.2,N =3.Wages fall much more quickly
with unemployment in the latter case.
Shelf Life, Product Quality,
Product Prices, and Clearance Sales:
The same model can be used to analyze the dynamics of product prices as
they relate to shelf life. Consider the problem facing the used—car salesman.
On average, he probably has better information than his customers about the
cars he sells. But on any given car, a buyer may actually know moreabout
that one car than the seller (P >k'but k ).0).Those cars that are
purchased most quickly tend to be the ones that are underpriced relative to
their value. The ones that remain on the lot are those that are overpriced
relative to their value.
In the same way that firms infer that their unraided workers are lower
quality than the estimate at the beginning of a round, 80 the cardealer
learns that the cars that remain on the lot are lower quality than estimated.
At the beginning of each day, he sets the price of the car, w(t),based upon
his evaluation of the observables: w(T) is the price below whichhe is
willing to keep the car. But w(t) falls with time on thelot. This is what—31—
clearance sales are about. Goods that remain on the shelf for a long period
of time are reduced in price to reflect the lower quality that consumers
attach to the less desirable color or style, which was not captured by initial
prices.
Additionally, the comparative statics with respect to P, N and e are
appropriate in the product case as well. If P is high so that buyers are
well informed, price falls more rapidly with shelf life. In the wholesale
market where buyers are the retailers and are themselves well informed, prices
on goods that remain on the warehouse shelf should fall quickly with time,
relative to those that remain on the retailer's shelf. Additionally, when
N is low, price remains more invariant to shelf time. For example, the price
of unusual houses for which the number of buyers is few should not fall as
steeply with time on the market as more homogeneous houses.
III. Summary and Conclusions
The focus of this paper is on turnover that occurs without unemployment.
Job turnover and the evolutIon of wages can be related to the size of the
market, the probability that a worker's ability level is discovered, and the
speed with which information travels through the market. The dispersion of
wages, slopes of age—earnings profiles, and the force of stigma are all
affected by these variables. A large number of buyers and easily identifiable
ability imply that stigma operates quickly and that the best workers are
raided first so that workers who do not receive outside offers find themselves
treated very differently from those who do.
The Peter Principle, that workers are promoted to their level of incompe-
tence, is an implication. Since the best workers are stolen or promoted out
of the job early, the older ones who remain and do not move further up the job—32—
ladder are low ability relative to the population of workers doing that job.
As a consequence of selective raiding, firms are left with lower than
average quality workers. This insures that workers always choose to be
employed by the best informed firm because that firm can offer the highest
wage. This is true, independent of worker ability. Even low ability workers
prefer to work at firms with the best information about worker ability. Thus,
initial employers may appear to screen for the rest of the market.
Although unemployment is not the primary focus, a reinterpretation of the
model provides implications for unemployed workers as well. Specifically,
those who are unemployed during recession and those who do not actively seek
jobs are likely to experience less adverse effects from the unemployment.
Finally, the model can be extended to examine product marketing prac-
tices. In particular, clearance sales and the general relationship between
shelf life and product price can be understood. The prices of wholesale goods
should fall more rapidly with time on the shelf than prices of retail goods.
Similarly, the prices of heterogeneous goods in these markets should be more
rigid with respect to time on the shelf.—33—
APPENDIX
MATRIXOF GENERALIZED STRATEGIES AND RESULTS
Thefollowing matrix characterizes all possibilities when firms can be
informed of the workers' ability, but also of other firms' beliefs. Define
"cognizant" to mean that the firm knows whether or not the rival firm is
informed. In each box is j or k, which tells where the worker ends up,















































































1: Both j and
is driven to




k know everything.j matches every offer from k so w
M and the worker stays at j.
is not cognizant.j
but to do so requires
stick to w = since < 1and
rents. Thus, picks off the worker at
3: k is informed, but does not know that j
jis cognizant,j recognizes this as a
at w +C. Since
and matches,
retaining the worker.
4: k raids at w +C, butj does not know if threat is serious.
Optimal response is to maintain w =w.Worker goes to k.
5. k is uninformed and realizes that j is informed. j maintains ww
since this provides k with no information, retains worker. No raid by
k at w > w is profitable.
6: No raid by k at w > w is profitable.
7: Same as 6.
8: Same as 6.
9: Although j is uninformed, he knows that k is informed. He infers M
from k so worker stays at M atw =M.(No bluffing strategy is
more profitable for k since M is the same at both firms.)
10; k is informed, but does not know that is. So k's optimal strategy
is to bid w +C. Sincej is cognizant, this is matched and worker
stays at j.
11:j's optimal strategy is to ignore the worker's claim of an outside
offer, so k gets worker at w1 +.
12:Same as 11.
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can either try to deter any
w =M.It is better for j to






13: Not profitable to raid at w >w so worker stays at j.
14:Same as 13.
15: Same as 13.
16: Same as 13.
With the assumption that all informed firms are cognizant and no
uninformed firms are cognizant, the matrix collapses to boxes 1, 7, 10, 16.
THE DERIVATION OF EQUATIONS
Equation 18
Consider the group with M such that w < M <w_1. No successful raid
can occur in rounds 1 through t —1because an uninformed current employer
pays w1 > w > M for T< t.. Thus,
R(T) =0 for t<t w< M < w1
During the t< trounds, however, firms are acquiring information on the
worker. Thus in round t, the probability that a given firm will have become
informed by then is (1 —pt)•Since there are N firms, there are
N(1 —pt)raids in round t via discovery. Thus,
R(T) =N(1—pt)for T=t w<M< w
t t—1
Now, in period T=t+1,either one raid occurred in period t, no
raidsoccurred,or more than one raid occurred. If no raids occurred, then—36—
t + 1 is like t. The probability of no raid in t isNt• This branch
yields NP raids in t + 1. The probability that there was exactly one raid
in t is N(1 —pt)pNtbecause there are N ways to have one firm informed
and the N others uninformed. If that occurs, then ON firms learn by





R(T) =NPNtEP+ (1 —Pt)N(P+ 8(1 —P))] for¶ =t+ 1.
w< M <
For periods t > t + 2, a raid can only occur if there was no or one raid in
T —1.The probability that there is no raid in T —1is n1)• This
gives rise to NP expected raids in T. If there was exactly one raid in
¶ —1,which happens with probability NPPtl), then this gives rise to
ON + (1 —8)NPraids. Thus,
R(t) =(T1)N[1+N(P + 8(1—P)))forT > t+2
wt<M < w_1
—
Soequation (18) is derived.
Equation 20
If ¶ > t such that Wt < M < w_1, then the probability of turnoveris
zero since no raids occur.
If T =t,then a turnover occurs if f the current employer is uninformed
and at least one outsider is informed. This occurs with probability—37—
pt(1 -pNt)
If t > t + 1, then turnover can occur because no turnover occurred
through I —1,at least one outsider becomes informed in I and the current
employer remains uninformed. This occurs with probability
-N(T—1) -N -T
P (1—P)P
Plternatively, exactly one raid could have occurred in T —1and that firm
could have "forgotten" M which occurs with probability (1 —0)while
another firm learns it either by inference or discovery. That probability is
NPN('nl)(l —(T—1))(,—0)[(1—(1—0)N)+ (1 — — N))
exactly one raidraider someone else no one infers but
in I —1 forgets infers someone else discovers
Thus,
(20) Prob. Turnover(T)< M <
1
=0 for r < t
-t -Nt =P(1-P ) forT=t
=N(T—1)(1—N)T+ [N(T1)(1 —(r—1))(1—0)]
for r > t+1.
[1 —(1—0)N+ (1 —$)N(1—N)]
——38—
Footnotes
*Helpful comments were provided by Dennis Canton, David Card, Richard
Freeman, Merton Miller, Melvin Reder, John Riley, Sherwin Rosen, and Robert
Topel. Work on this paper was supported in part by the National Science
Foundation.
See Phelps (1970), for a collection of these early papers.
2See Doeringer and Piore (1981), Thurow (1972),
3The most notable model of wage determination is Becker (1975). Others
include Lazear (1979), Lazear and Rosen (1981), and Harris and Holrnstrorn
(198—). The model that most effectively deals with job turnover in the
absence of unemployment is Jovanovic (1979). Although the theory of specific
human capital attempts to integrate wage dynamics with labor turnover, too
much indeterminacy remains to have a very informative set of predictions.
This is rectified somewhat by the work of Kuratani (1973), Hashimoto (1979),
Hashimoto and Yu (1980) and Hall and Lazear (1982).
4See Peter (1969).
5All that this requires is a small moving cost.
6See, for example, Wilson (1977), Milgrom and Weber (1982), and Riley and
Samuelson (1981) for a more complete discussion.
7mis ignores any firm—specific aspects of the problem.
8See Harris and Townsend [1981] for a discussion of incentive
compatibility and invertibility.
9This is a direct result of the discrete nature of information. In a
more continuous setup, it is possible that w(M) with w > 0 might serve a
deterrence role. But this complicates the problem greatly without any obvious
changes in implications.—39—
0A fixedw is also least susceptible to moral hazard problems where
the firm tries to deceive the worker into believing that M is low. Also, it
best masks j's knowledge from k.
Thatw >0is obvious since1 - <Iso both 1/(1 — and
111(1 — exceed1. It is also true that w < 1/2. To see this, define
x E1/(1— andassume the opposite: Then
—1)/(x—1)>1/2
or
> l/2x + 1/2
This implies
o > —2x+ 1
But x2 —2x+ 1has a mm. at x =1where the value of x2 —2x+ 1 =0.
Thus, a contradiction is obtained, so w < 1/2
ignores the kind of bargaining problem between worker and firm
that t'brtensen (1978) discusses. Rubinstein (1982) solves that problem when
the value of the good is known to both parties, but the essence of the problem
is that even if the worker knows M, and the seller knows that the worker
knows M, there is uncertainty as to whether the firm knows M. Recall that
the firm is only informed of the time so (1 —P)
the time only knows
the distribution and w is the optimum under these circumstances. This
means that 1 of the time, a worker who demands w > w will be let go.
For most reasonable values of (likely to be small), it is optimal for the
worker merely to accept Wj. There are two caveats: First, if the worker
costlessly and immediately can obtain another job that pays then all
workers with M > w try to bargain. Second, if the demand by the worker
conveys the appropriate information to the firm about M, it may pay to4
—40—
bargain even if the firm is uninformed (see the discussion by Fudenberg and
Tirole (1983) on the effects of adding a period to a game). Note also that
the higher is M, the more the worker has to gain so the more likely is the
worker to demand w > w.
3See Grossman (1976), Grossman and Stiglitz (1976, 1980), Canton
(1982), and Gould and Verrecchia (1983) for examples of drawing inferences
from observable market variables.
14The same kind of udel can be used to explain "runs." One individual
makes a discovery, and the rest imitate his behavior. Similarly, the ideas
here are closely related to the literature on technological innovation and its
diffusion across firms.
5The length of the round is defined to be that period over which
information remains private.
16The same mechanism is at work in the market for firms, where takeover
attempts tip off other potential buyers of the firm. As such, this framework
can be used to explain takeover bid behavior as well (see Bradley, Desai, and
Kim (1982), and Jarrell (1983)).
17This is similar to technology diffusion as analyzed by Spence (1982).
Griliches (1982) discusses recent work on the issue. Telser (1982), who
analyzes innovation, constructs an alternative model of technical change where
diffusion of information plays a secondary role.
Assume 6 sufficiently large so that the probability that no firm
learns by inference is close to zero.
9Proofthat-











To see this, define Y E x Then the numerator is positive if f
2 >y+l/y
which is a contradiction for any y > 0.
20See the pioneering work by Reder (1955) for an early attempt to explain
differences in wages across occupations.
is the limiting case. If P =1,then it is impossible for the
current employer to be uninformed.
22There are a number of papers that examine empirically what happens to
wages when a job change is made. The general finding seems to be that wage
change on a job switch is greater for younger workers and often negative for
older ones. See, for example, Borjas and Rosen (1980), Bartel (1980), Bartel
and Bor-ias (1981).
23A complication is that tenure is also related to unemployment, with
which the model only deals as an afterthought. For example, workers who
suffer frequent spells of unemployment may have the lowest levels of tenure
among all workers and they are likely to be the least able group.
24See, for example, Ellwood (1982); also Clark and Summers (1982) and
FlinnandHecknian (1983).—42—
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Average Wage of
Worker Raided in
Round W(t) Round CT) Difference
P .001, N =3
1 .4996 .7498 .2502
2 .4992 .7496 .2504
3 .4989 .7494 .2506
4 .4985 .7492 .2508
5 .4981 .7491 .2509
6 .4978 .7489 .2511
7 .4974 .7487 .2513
8 .4970 .7485 .2515
9 .4966 .7483 .2517
10 .4962 .7481 .2519
11 .4959 .7479 .2521
12 .4955 .7477 .2522
13 .4951 .7476 .2524
14 .4947 .7474 .2526
15 .4944 .7472 .2528
P =.01,N =3
1 .4962 .7481 .2519
2 .4925 .7462 .2537
3 .4887 .7442 .2555
4 .4849 .7423 .2574
5 .4812 .7403 .2592
6 .4774 .7384 .2610
7 .4736 .7365 .2628
8 .4699 .7345 .2646
9 .4661 .7326 .2664
10 .4624 .7306 .2682
11 .4586 .7287 .2700
12 .4549 .7267 .2718
13 .4512 .7248 .2736
14 .4474 .7228 .2754
15 .4437 .7209 .2772
P =.2,N 3
1 .4171 .7085 .2915
2 .3386 .6397 .3011
3 .2681 .5635 .2954
4 .2077 .4832 .2755
5 .1579 .4028 .2449
6 .1183 .3268 .2084
7 .0876 .2585 .1709
8 .0643 .2000 .1357
9 .0469 .1519 .1051
10 .0340 .1137 .0798
11 .0246 .0842 .0596
12 .0177 .0617 .0440
13 .0127 .0450 .0322
14 .0091 .0326 .0235
15 .0066 .0235 .0170Average Wage of
Worker Raided in
Round W(t) Round (T) Difference
P =.001,N =100
1 .4875 .7437 .2563
2 .4750 .7369 .2619
3 .4625 .7299 .2674
4 .4501 .7230 .2728
5 .4378 .7160 .2782
6 .4255 .7089 .2834
7 .4133 .7018 .2885
8 .4013 .6947 .2935
9 .3893 .6876 .2983
10 .3775 .6805 .3030
11 .3658 .6733 .3075
12 .3543 .6662 .3119
13 .3429 .6590 .3161
14 .3317 .6518 .3201
15 .3207 .6446 .3239
P =.01,N =100
1 .3769 .6885 .3115
2 .2680 .5701 .3022
3 .1813 .4420 .2607
4 .1182 .3211 .2029
5 .0750 .2207 .1457
6 .0467 .1453 .0985
7 .0288 .0928 .0640
8 .0176 .0581 .0405
9 .0107 .0359 .0252
10 .0065 .0220 .0155
11 .0040 .0134 .0095
12 .0024 .0082 .0058
13 .0015 .0050 .0035
14 .0009 .0030 .0021
15 .0005 .0018 .0013
P =2,N > 1
1 0 .5 .5
2 0 .5 .5
3 0 .5 .5
4 0 .5 .5
5 0 .5 .5
6 0 .5 .5
7 0 .5 .5
8 0 .5 .5
9 0 .5 .5
10 0 .5 .5
11 0 .5 .5
12 0 .5 .5
13 0 .5 .5
14 0 .5 .5
15 0 .5 .5Average Wage of
Worker Raided in
Round W(t) Round (t) Difference
P.001, N =10
1 .4987 .7494 .2506
2 .4975 .7487 .2512
3 .4962 .7481 .2519
4 .4950 .7475 .2525
5 .4937 .7468 .2531
6 .4925 .7462 .2537
7 .4912 .7456 ..2543
8 .4900 .7450 .2550
9 .4887 .7443 .2556
10 .4875 .7437 .2562
11 .4862 .7431 .2568
12 .4850 .7424 .2574
13 .4837 .7418 .2580
14 .4825 .7412 .2587
15 .4812 .7405 .2593
P =.01,N 10
1 .4874 .7437 .2563
2 .4749 .7368 .2619
3 .4624 .7298 .2675
4 .4499 .7228 .2729
5 .4375 .7158 .2783
6 4252 .7087 .2835
7 .4130 .7016 .2886
8 .4008 .6945 .2936
9 .3889 .6873 .2985
10 .3769 .6801 .3032
11 .3652 .6730 .3077
12 .3537 .6657 .3121
13 .3423 .6585 .3163
14 .3310 .6513 .3203
15 .3200 .6411 .3241
P.2, N =10
1 .2468 .6234 .3766
2 .0970 .3302 .2332
3 .0340 .1340 .1000
4 .0114 .0475 .0361
5 .0038 .0160 .0122
6 .0012 .0053 .0041
7 .0004 .0017 .0013
8 .0001 .0006 .0004
9 .0000 .0002 .0001
10 .0000 .0001 .0000
11 .0000 .0000 .0000
12 .0000 .0000 .0000
13 .0000 .0000 .0000
14 .0000 .0000 .0000
15 .0000 .0000 .0000P
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